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TAX REFORM ACT: DENIAL OF CHARITABLE
DEDUCTION FOR THE USE OF PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION
The Tax Reform Act of 19691 passed by Congress on December
11 and signed into law by the President on December 30, 1969, pro-
vides as follows in the charitable contributions section:
(3) Denial of deduction in case of certain contributions
of partial interests in property.-In the case of a contribu-
tion (not made by a transfer in trust) of an interest in
property which consists of less than the taxpayer's entire
interest in such property, a deduction shall be allowed un-
der this section only to the extent that the value of the
interest contributed would be allowable as a deduction
under this section if such interest had been transferred
in trust. For purposes of this subparagraph, a contribu-
tion by a taxpayer of the right to use property shall be
treated as a contribution of less than the taxpayer's entire
interest in such property.
2
This new provision eliminates charitable deductions for gifts of
the use of property for limited periods and, thereby, settles the dis-
agreement between the Internal Revenue Service and the courts3
which, though infrequently litigated, is important to charitable
donors. This Comment will trace the legislative and case history
of the problem surrounding the giving of charitable deductions
for a gift of the use of property for limited periods. It will then
examine the effect of the Tax Reform Act on gifts of use of prop-
erty, particularly contributions of rent-free office space.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. - (Dec. 30, 1969).
2. Id. § 201 (a). Deduction is not allowed for a charitable gift of
the remainder interest in a trust unless it is a charitable remainder
annuity trust (specifies in dollars the amount to be paid to the beneficiary
annually) or a charitable remainder unitrust (specifies the beneficiary's
annual income based on a fixed percent of the net fair market value of
the trust's assets). Id. §§ 201(e), (h), (i). Deduction is not allowed for
the income interest of a trust with a noncharitable remainder unless the
grantor is taxable on that income or unless all interests in the trust are
given to the charity. Charitable deduction for an income interest in the
trust is also not allowed unless the income beneficiary receives a guar-
anteed annuity or a fixed percentage annually of the fair market value of
the trust property. Id. § 201(a); See. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 58-62 (1969).
3. Compare Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis.




In 1917 Congress amended the Revenue Act of 19164 by adding
contributions to charities to the list of income tax deductions:
Ninth. Contributions, or gifts actually made within the
year to corporations or associations organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or edu-
cational purposes, or to societies for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net in-
come of which inures to the benefit of any private stock-
holder or individual .... 5
This section was not materially changed until 1938 when the word
"payment" was inserted: "(o) Charitable and Other Contributions.
-In the case of an individual, contributions or gifts payment of
which is made within the taxable year to or for the use of .... (I
The Internal Revenue Service has argued that insertion of the
word "payment" excludes deductions for the use of property under
a leasehold interest since there can be no "payment" made of the
property.7 The Service's argument, however, does not agree with
the reason given in the House Report of 1938 for amending the
1917 revenue bill:8
Under the various Revenue Acts the deduction for con-
tributions is allowed for the taxable year in which the
contribution is made .... In the interest of certainty in
the administration of the revenue laws, it is desirable
to dispel this confusion by enacting a clear and uniform
statutory rule to govern this situation.
The bill provides that the deduction for contributions
or gifts for charitable and other purposes shall be allowed
only for the taxable year in which the contribution is
actually paid. The allowance of the deduction in the year
when actually paid will provide a clearer rule without
hardship to the taxpayer and will eliminate the un-
certainty in the administration of the deduction.9
The 1938 amendment was one to reduce administrative difficulties
in determining the year of deduction; it did not alter the type of
gifts included under the charitable contribution section. 10
4. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 1201(2), 39 Stat. 756.
5. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
6. Act of May 28, 1938, ch. 289, § 23(o), 52 Stat. 447, 463 [hereinafter
referred to in the text as 1939 Code].
7. I.T. 3918, 1948-2 CUM. BULL. 33. See discussion at note 46 and
accompanying text infra.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938), [hereinafter
also referred to in the text as 1938 House Report], 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 728.
9. Id. at 741-742.
10. See Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
The 1938 Report also stated the basic policy in favor of deduc-
tions for charitable contributions:
The exemption from taxation of money or property
devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss
of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion
of the general welfare.1
The legislative statement of policy contained in the 1938 Report
is as valid today as it was in 1938. Encouragement of charitable
contributions, a policy also advanced by the courts, 12 is necessary
today to relieve the government of some of the burdens of provid-
ing for the welfare of its citizens, and charitable deductions from
income tax are a most persuasive form of encouragement.
In the Internal Revenue Code of 19541" various sections 1 4 of
the 1939 Code were consolidated into section 170, and an additional
deduction of up to ten percent of adjusted gross income over and
above the existing deduction limit of twenty percent was allowed
for contribution made to certain enumerated charitable organiza-
tions.' 5 In reporting on the passage of section 170, the House
Ways and Means Committee said, "It is to be noted that such chari-
table contributions must be paid to the organization and not for
the use of the organization."' 6 While Congress added special con-
ditions to the amendments in the 1954 Code, as in the restriction
on the additional ten percent allowed deduction for charitable
contributions, it did not change the meaningful sections of previous
acts included in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code; the phrase "to
or for the use of" was retained in the definition of charitable con-
tributions and continued to apply to the general twenty percent
deduction. This 1954 House Report, therefore, is not helpful in
interpreting the meaning of the charitable deductions sections
which have been in force virtually unchanged since 1939. The de-
termination of which donations constitute contributions or gifts
11. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938), 1939-1 CuM.
BULL. 728, 742.
12. United States v. Pleasants, 305 U.S. 357 (1939); Helvering v.
Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934).
13. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1964) [hereinafter also referred to in the text
as 1954 Code].
14. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4019:
Section 170 of the bill consolidates section 23(o) of the 1939
Code, relating to charitable contributions by individuals; section
23(q) of the 1939 Code, relating to charitable contributions by
corporations; and section 120 of the 1939 Code, relating to the un-
limited deduction of charitable contributions by individuals.
Id. at 4189.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 170(b) (1) (A) (1964).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954) [hereinafter also
referred to in the text as 1954 House Report], 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4019, 4190 (emphasis by the Committee).
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"to or for the use of" an organization has been left largely to in-
terpretation by the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
The relevant sections of the 1954 Code are:
(a) Allowance of deduction.-
(1) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a de-
duction any charitable contribution(as defined in subsec-
tion (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable
year....
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For purposes of this
section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contri-
bution or gift to or for the use of-17
"To oR FOR THE USE OF" INTERPRETED
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts have not always
agreed on the interpretation of the charitable deductions section.' s
Though infrequently litigated, there has been, as previously in-
dicated, a divergence of opinion concerning deductions for allowing
a charity the use of property. For example, consider the following
situation: A owns an office or apartment building and a charitable
organization1 9 asks him to donate office space for its use for a
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(a), (c), 26 U.S.C. § 170(a), (c)
(1964) (emphasis added). This language is retained in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, § 201(a), (c).
18. See note 3 supra.
19. Organizations qualifying under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
are as follows:
(1) A State, a Territory, a possession of the United States, or
any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United
States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution
or gift is made for exclusively public purposes.
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foun-
dation-
(A) created or organized in the United States, any State
or Territory, the District of Columbia, or any possession of
the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
(D) no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation.
(3) A post or organization of war veterans, or an auxiliary
unit or society of, or trust or foundation for, any such post or
organization-
(A) organized in the United States or any of its posses-
sions, and
(B) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
(4) In the case of a contribution or gift by an individual, a
limited period of time; A has empty space in his building and
agrees to lease it to the charity. The question that arises is whether
the fair rental value of that space is deductible from his income
tax as a charitable contribution.
In Threlfall v. United States20 the United States District Court
in Wisconsin decided the issue in favor of the taxpayer. The
court relied mainly on three cases: Priscilla M. Sullivan,2 1 Mattie
Fair,22 and Passailaigue v. United States.
23
Freehold Interests
In Priscilla M. Sullivan2 4 the taxpayer in 1942 conveyed2 5 a
house in fee without consideration to the American National Red
Cross which was to hold the property until the war ended or until
the local Red Cross chapter ceased to use it as a headquarters,
whichever occurred first. The taxpayer claimed a deduction based
on the rental value of the house for each year of use. The Tax
Court held that the taxpayer conveyed a determinable fee with
the right of reverter in the taxpayer which is an irrevocable in-
terest in the property. The property interest was according to the
Tax Court of indefinite duration and could not be terminated by
the taxpayer. The contribution was, therefore, a completed gift in
1942, and the allowable deduction was the fair market value of the
property in that year. Here, because the conveyance was in fee,
the court could find a single completed gift and avoid the question
of mere "use" of property apart from ownership. The court stated:
When the transfer was completed, it [the Red Cross]
became the owner of the property subject to a right of
domestic fraternal society, order, or association, operating under
the lodge system, but only if such contribution or gift is to be
used exclusively for religious, chartiable, scientific, literary, or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals.
(5) A cemetery company owned and operated exclusively
for the benefit of its members, or any corporation chartered
solely for burial puroses as a cemetery corporation and not per-
mitted by its charter to engage in any business not necessarily
incident to that purpose, if such company or corporation is not
operated for profit and no part of the net earnings of such company
or corporation inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual.
For purposes of this section the term "charitable contribution"
also means an amount treated under subsection (d) as paid for
the use of an organization described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170(c), 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1964); INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 170 (d) continues in pertinent part as follows: "(d) Amounts
paid to maintain certain students as members of taxpayer's household.-"
26 U.S.C. § 170(d) (1964).
20. 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
21. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
22. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
23. 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
24. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
25. The property was conveyed to an attorney who reconveyed it to
the American National Red Cross.
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reverter in the petitioner in accordance with the terms of
the deed. Thus, petitioner was no longer liable for real
estate taxes with respect to the property, and in fact paid
none after March 30, 1942.26
In Mattie Fair27 the taxpayer owned a two story building. In
1948 she conveyed to the Fair Foundation, a charitable organiza-
tion, the right to build, own and maintain five additional stories;
she also conveyed an easement for the right to use part of her
building for a lobby, stairways, and elevators. The taxpayer
was under no duty to maintain the supporting building, and in
the event it was destroyed, she had the option to rebuild. If tax-
payer rebuilt, the Foundation also had the right to rebuild. The
ownership of taxpayer's property and the ownership of the prop-
erty granted to the Foundation was to be separate and distinct.
The taxpayer claimed a charitable deduction based on an eval-
uation of the conveyed rights made by the Tyler (Texas) Real
Estate Board. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue took the
position that the rights conveyed did not constitute property in
that no interest in the ground was conveyed. The Tax Court
agreed with the taxpayer and allowed the deduction. The Tax
Court said, "Property is the sum of rights and powers incident
to ownership" 8 and the right to use air space is frequently the
most valuable right in land. The Tax Court noted further that
the taxpayer had conveyed a present irrevocable interest in the
property.
Leasehold Interests
In Passailaigue v. United States2 9 the District Court of the
Middle District of Georgia dealt directly with a leasehold interest
donated to a charitable organization. In 1959 taxpayer leased to
Youth Craft Shop, Inc., a charitable organization, a parcel of land
under an oral lease and later under a written lease.3 0 Youth Craft
26. 16 T.C. 228, 231 (1951).
27. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
28. Id. at 872. The evaluation included the cost of the portion of
the building used for entrance, lobby, elevator and storage as well as the
value of the portion of the lot used for the building entrance lobby, elevator
and storage. Id. at 870.
29. 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
30. The lease stated:
Landlord has given to Tenant and Tenant has accepted from
Landlord as a gift the use and rental of the premises located in
the City of Columbus. ...
Tenant shall not pay to Landlord any sum for the use, occupancy
and rental of said premises, it being the intention of the parties
paid no rent; the lease was to run indefinitely until taxpayer gave
fifteen days written notice of termination. In 1959 and 1960 tax-
payer deducted the fair rental value of the property as charitable
contributions. The Commissioner assessed deficiencies against him;
the deficiencies were paid, and a claim for refund was filed.
The Commissioner contended that since Passailaigue did not
part with title to the property, no gift was made. Instead, accord-
ing to the Commissioner's contention, the taxpayer granted only
a privilege for the use and enjoyment of the property. The Inter-
nal Revenue Service relied upon its own construction3 1 of the 1939
Code that:
[P] ermission to use and occupy property granted to an
organization described in section 23(o) of the Code does
not represent a payment made to or for the use of the
organization within the meaning of that section. Such an
arrangement does not constitute a gift of property. It
is merely the granting of a privilege for which no charge is
made.3
2
The taxpayer contended he transferred a valuable property right
with a determinable value.
Upholding the taxpayer's contention, the court observed that
in Mattie Fair33 and Priscilla M. Sullivan34 the grants were made
for an indeterminable period; the building could have burned or
the war could have ended immediately. In this case the charitable
organization could at least rely on fifteen days use. The court
viewed the important question as not whether the right might be
terminated but whether the right was terminated.3 5  Youth Craft
had exclusive use of the property for two years.
Expanding on the views of the Tax Court in Priscilla M. Sulli-
van36 the court held:
[I]t [Property] is also the sum of all the rights and
powers incident to ownership of the physical thing. It is
the tangible and the intangible. Property is composed of
constituent elements and of these elements the right to
use the physical thing to the exclusion of others is the
most essential and beneficial.
37
Without the right to use the property according to the court the
owner has little more than naked legal title.38 The substance of
to this contract that Landlord hereby gives the use, occupancy and
rental of said property to Tenant....
Id. at 687.
31. I.T. 3918, 1948-2 CuM. ButL.. 33.
32. Id. at 34 (emphasis by the Internal Revenue Service).
33. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
34. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
35. Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
36. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
37. Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 682, 686 (M.D. Ga.
1963).
38. Id. at 686.
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what the transfer accomplishes is more important than its form,
and in Priscilla M. Sullivan"9 and Mattie Fair40 taxpayers both
transferred the right to use property despite the difference in form.
The Georgia District Court looked beyond the conveyance for-
malities used in Mattie Fair41 and Priscilla M. Sullivan42 which
the Internal Revenue Service contended were distinguishable on
the facts. It found a valuable property interest had been given
to a charitable organization as a gift; the value of that gift, the
fair rental value of the property, was properly deducted as a chari-
table contribution.
Recently the Western District Court of Wisconsin followed the
decision in Passailaigue v. United States.43 In Threlfall v. United
States44 the taxpayer at the request of the United Cerebral Palsy
Foundation agreed to allow that organization the use of office space
in a building he owned. He donated the office space for an original
period of two and one-half months; the Foundation occupied the
space for three and one-half months. Threlfall claimed a chari-
table deduction of the rental value of the space used.
The Internal Revenue Service contended that the donation of
the office space was similar to the contribution of services for
which no deduction is allowed 45 and that contribution of the use
and occupancy of the property was not "payment to or for the use
of" the organization.
46
The court discussed the legislative policy of encouraging chari-
table contributions and, therefore, held that section 170 of the 1954
Code should be liberally construed to include the instant leasehold.
Addressing itself to the Internal Revenue Service's contention that
Priscilla M. Sullivan47 and Mattie Fair48 involved freehold rather
than leasehold interests, the court held:
I conclude that for the purposes of Section 170 there is
no significant distinction between a donation of a free-
hold interest and a donation of a leasehold interest. It
39. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
40. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
41. Id.
42. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
43. 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
44. 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
45. Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer
serving on boards and committees of Methodist Church); Rev. Rul. 67-236,
1967-2 Cum. BULL. 103 (radio station providing free broadcast time for
religious and public affairs programs); Rev. Rul. 57-462, 1957-2 CuM.
BuLL. 157 (newspaper donating space to a charitable organization).
46. I.T. 3918, 1948-2 CUM. BULL. 33.
47. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
48. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
appears, therefore, that Passaillaigue [sic] v. United States,
supra, was correctly decided and should be followed here.
Accordingly, I conclude that the granting of permission by
plaintiff to the Foundation to use space in plaintiff's build-
ing transferred a property interest to the Foundation and
constituted a "charitable contribution" within the meaning
of Section 170(a) (1). 9
The court also stated "payment" was a term added to the 1939
Revenue Code for the purpose of eliminating uncertainty in ad-
ministering charitable deductions by providing for the time of de-
duction.50
The Georgia and Wisconsin courts rejected the Commissioner's
contention that the donation of the office space under a lease con-
stituted a service rather than a deductible gift. The Internal Rev-
enue Service's position that the value of services rendered to a
charitable organization is not deductible has not been challenged by
the courts.51 Unreimbursed expenses directly connected with and
solely attributable to the performance of the volunteer service are,
however, deductible. 52 For example, a nurse's aide working gra-
tuitously for the American Red Cross at a local hospital may not
deduct the value of her services. However, she may deduct her
unreimbursed expenses for transportation to and from the hos-
pital, for cost and maintenance of Red Cross uniforms and for cost
of gloves and shoes worn exclusively with the uniform. She may
not deduct the cost of lunches while performing her services unless
the service required her to be away from home overnight.53 These
payments are considered to be payments for the use of the chari-
table organization. Similarly, a taxpayer using his car and air-
plane partly for charitable purposes may deduct unreimbursed ex-
penses for gas and oil, pilot's fees and license registration fees but
not for depreciation, insurance and repair fees.
54
49. Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
50. Id.
51. See authorities cited note 43 supra.
52. Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965) (expenses for
gas, oil, pilot's fees and license registration fees for use of car and airplane
for charitable purposes); Henry Cartan, 30 T.C. 208 (1958) (expenses in-
curred on trips to Chicago for Red Cross chapter); Rev. Rul. 69-473, 1969
INT. REv. BULL. No. 36, at 8 (deduction for expenses incurred participating
in a program to assist unmarried pregnant women); Rev. Rul. 58-279,
1958-1 CUM. BULL. 145 (expenses for operation, maintenance and repair
of car and airplane used in service for Civil Air Patrol); Rev. Rul. 58-240,
1958-1 CuM. BULL. 141 (expenses incurred in attending church convention
as a delegate and in attending American Legion convention as a delegate);
Rev. Rul. 56-509, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 129 (expenses incurred by civil de-
fense volunteers traveling to attend meetings and to watch atomic bomb
tests); Rev. Rul. 56-508, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 129 (expenses incurred for
transportation and uniforms by nurse's aide for American Red Cross); Rev.
Rul. 55-4, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 291 (expenses incurred for travel, meals and
lodging by officer of association).
53. Rev. Rul. 56-508, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 126.
54. Orr v. United States, 343 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1965).
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The courts have had no difficulty distinguishing between per-
formance of a service and gift of a leasehold interest. The donee
of the leased property acquires according to the courts exclusive
control and possession of it, but the courts say this important ele-
ment of possession and control is absent in voluntary service
cases. 5 The important element of possession and control makes
the contribution one of property rather than service; it also ren-
ders meaningless the distinction between the freehold and lease-
hold interests which the Commissioner contended distinguished the
fact situations in Passailaigue v. United States5 6 and Threlfall v.
United States57 from the Priscilla M. Sullivan5 and Mattie Fair0
cases. In both the latter cases the donors would regain possession
and title to the property. Though in form a freehold interest was
conveyed, in substance the same interest was conveyed under the
leases. The gifts were of property and fell within the meaning of
section 170.60
The court in Passailaigue v. United States"' recognized that
a valuable property interest, though less than a freehold, had been
contributed to Youth Craft for its use. The value of that gift
was readily ascertainable. As early as 1930 the Board of Tax Ap-
peals noted:
The statute does not specify that only certain kinds of
gifts are deductible. The only limitation found in the stat-
ute is as to the class of "donees" and in an amount not to
exceed 15 per centum of the taxpayer's net income .... 62
As shown in the legislative history of section 170(a) (1) and 170(c)
of the 1954 Code, no substantive change was made by the technical
language changes these sections made to the Code. Congress
amended the Internal Revenue Code since 1921 to deal specifically
with situations involving trusts
0 3 and tangible personal property
6 4
but never amended it to preclude deductions for the gift of a lease-
hold interest by an individual. The Internal Revenue Service al-
lowed deductions for restrictive easements6 5 and undivided present
55. Threlfall v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
56. 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
57. 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
58. 16 T.C. 228 (1951).
59. 27 T.C. 866 (1957).
60. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) (1966).
61. 224 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
62. J.T. Fargason, 21 B.T.A. 1032, 1037 (1930).
63. INT. REV._CODE of 1954, § 642(c), 26 U.S.C. § 642(c) (1964).
64. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 170(f), 26 U.S.C. § 170(f) (1964),
amending 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1954).
65. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 CuM. BuLL. 62.
interests in property66 leased to the state when donated to the
state for exclusively public purposes. Donations to a govern-
mental unit for exclusively public purposes should, however, be
given no greater rights to deduction than the rights received for
the same type of donations given to other charitable organiza-
tions, since a governmental unit is only one of the organizations
described in the charitable deductions section of the Code.67 Thus,
until the Tax Reform Act was passed the courts allowed a deduc-
tion for the gift of a leasehold interest in property to a charitable
organization.
TAx REFORM ACT
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969,6s the conflict between the
courts and the Internal Revenue Service concerning the gift of of-
fice space for use by a charitable organization is resolved. The
Act makes such a gift nondeductible. The House Ways and Means
Committee Report states:
Explanation of provision-Your committee's bill, in
effect, provides that a charitable deduction is not to be
allowed for contributions to charity of less than the tax-
payer's entire interest in property, such as the right to use
property for a period of time. The taxpayer, however, will
be able to continue to exclude from his income the value
of the right to use the property contributed to the charity-
representing the equivalent of the rental income from
such property.69
The House Ways and Means Committee was disturbed by what it
termed a double deduction under the existing Code. The taxpayer
could deduct the fair rental value of the property as a charitable
contribution and was not required to report the rental value as
income. The Committee said:
For example, if the individual owns an office building, he
may donate the use of 10 percent of its rental space to a
charity for 1 year. As a result, he may report for tax
purposes 90 percent of the income which he otherwise
would have had if the building were fully rented, and may
claim a charitable deduction (amounting to 10 percent of
the rental value of the building) which offsets his reduced
rental income. He, therefore, may exclude 10 percent of
the amount which would have been included in his income
if the property had been rented to a noncharitable party.
70
66. Rev. Rul. 57-511, 1957-2 CUB. BULL. 158.
67. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(c), 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1964),
quoted in note 17 supra. For a list of these charitable organizations, see
Cumulative List of Organizations Described in Section 170(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Internal Revenue Service, Pub. No. 78,
Dec. 31, 1968; Supplement to Publication No. 78, Supp. No. 1969-4, Jan.-
Aug., 1969; 1969 INT. Rrv. BULL. No. 47, at 35; 1969 INT. REv. BULL. No.
39, at 14.
68. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. - (Dec. 30, 1969).
69. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 57, 58 (1969).
70. Id. at 57.
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Inherent in the double deduction argument is the theory of con-
structive recognition of the rental value in the gross income of the
contributor. The Internal Revenue Service urged the constructive
recognition of income position in Threlfall v. United States,71 but
the court held that the purpose of the charitable deduction was to
encourage charitable contributions and that the taxpayer need not
constructively recognize gross income for the amount of rental in-
come sacrificed.
72
Discouraging charitable contributions of office space may work
hardship on charitable organizations by making it difficult to ob-
tain office space rent free. If a prospective donor has unoccupied
space in his building, he has two choices: keeping the space vacant
or donating it to a charitable organization for its use. Before the
Tax Reform Act, if the space remained vacant, there was no income
to report or constructively recognize and no charitable deductions;
if the space were occupied by a charity, by court decision, there was
no constructive recognition of income, but a charitable deduction
of the fair rental value was allowed. Under the Reform Act, the
income tax consequences are the same whether the space remains
vacant or whether it is donated to a charity, the taxpayer need not
constructively recognize income but he is not allowed a charitable
deduction. The taxpayer, therefore, gains nothing by donating the
space to a charity under the new system. It may be to the tax-
payer's advantage, however, to keep the space vacant in anticipa-
tion of a rent paying tenant. He, therefore, is not induced to allow
the charity to use the space and may not want to foreclose his
opportunity to rent it immediately to a paying tenant. If so, the
charity, needing office space, will have to use some of its charitable
funds to pay rent, thus diverting those funds from the charitable
purposes of the organization.
If the prospective contributor donates money to the charity
to be used to pay rent for office space, the contribution is deduc-
tible, but the contributor has already included this money in his
gross income. While the contributor may be unwilling or unable
to make a money donation, he may be willing to allow the organi-
zation the use of his unoccupied space for several months if given
a financial incentive to do so. The gift would be as meaningful
to the charity as a deductible money gift.
CONCLUSION
In as much as constructive recognition of income would dis-
71. 302 F. Supp. 1114 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
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courage charitable contributions, the Tax Reform Act which has
the same net effect tends to remove incentives for donating office
space to a charity. The House Ways and Means Committee Report
on the Reform Act states: "In order to strengthen the incentive
effect of the charitable contributions deduction for taxpayers gen-
erally, your committee has increased the present 30-percent limi-
tation to 50 percent .. . -'T Disallowing deductions for the gift
of the use of property contradicts this expressed desire to encourage
charitable giving. The contribution of rent-free office space to a
charitable organization should be encouraged by the government.
Charities should be helped, not hindered, in their attempts to find
offices, and for this reason the former policy of deductibility ad-
vanced by the courts should be restored.
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